Published in: OASIcs, Volume 97, 3rd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2021)
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes, and Mitchell Stern. Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee Market (Invited Talk). In 3rd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2021). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 97, p. 6:1, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)
@InProceedings{ferreira_et_al:OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.6, author = {Ferreira, Matheus V. X. and Moroz, Daniel J. and Parkes, David C. and Stern, Mitchell}, title = {{Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee Market}}, booktitle = {3rd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols (Tokenomics 2021)}, pages = {6:1--6:1}, series = {Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-220-4}, ISSN = {2190-6807}, year = {2022}, volume = {97}, editor = {Gramoli, Vincent and Halaburda, Hanna and Pass, Rafael}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.6}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-159039}, doi = {10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2021.6}, annote = {Keywords: Blockchain, Posted-price mechanism, Credible, Incentive compatibility, Transaction fee market, first-price auction, EIP-1559} }
Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 215, 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)
Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions. In 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 215, pp. 66:1-66:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)
@InProceedings{essaidi_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.66, author = {Essaidi, Meryem and Ferreira, Matheus V. X. and Weinberg, S. Matthew}, title = {{Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions}}, booktitle = {13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)}, pages = {66:1--66:19}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-217-4}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2022}, volume = {215}, editor = {Braverman, Mark}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.66}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-156621}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.66}, annote = {Keywords: Credible Auctions, Cryptographically Secure, Single-Item} }
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